A Bad Proposal by Whelan, Edward
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 63 Number 2 Article 7 
4-1-2015 
A Bad Proposal 
Edward Whelan 
Ethics and Public Policy Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Statistics and Probability Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward Whelan, A Bad Proposal, 63 Buff. L. Rev. 391 (2015). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol63/iss2/7 
This Response is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
RESPONSE
A Bad Proposal
EDWARD WHELANt
Todd Pettys's critique' of the Epstein-Parker-Segal
study2 is devastating, but there is one point that I think he
gets wrong. Noting that Epstein, Parker, and Segal "urge
other researchers to join the search for in-group biases
among judges and justices, both within the free-expression
realm and beyond," Pettys calls this "a good proposal."3 No.
There is no reason to think that the tools of modern political
science are capable of generating meaningful insights into
whether in-group bias affects judicial decision-making.
First, as Pettys shows, the general enterprise of
identifying whether a justice would perceive a litigant to be
part of the justice's ideological in-group is fraught with
intractable difficulties. What information about the litigant
should the justice be deemed to know? Does the relevant
inquiry focus on the perceived ideology of the litigant or on
the perceived ideological valence of the litigant's cause in the
particular case? (Note here the curious claim by Epstein,
Parker, and Segal that Pettys is "too focused on the
t Edward Whelan is president of the Ethics and Public Policy Center.
1. Todd E. Pettys, Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and the Court's
Conservatives: A Critique of the Epstein-Parker-Segal Study, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 1
(2015).
2. Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey A. Segal, Do Justices Defend
the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First Amendment,
available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBias.pdf (last visited Feb.
2, 2015) [hereinafter Epstein et al., In-Group Bias].
3. Pettys, supra note 1, at 74-75.
4. See generally id.
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ideological characteristics of the speaker rather than the
speech.")5 How sensible is it to assume that all justices
classified as conservative or as liberal have identical
ideological in-groups? Is Justice Breyer's ideological in-group
really the same as Justice Sotomayor's? Or is Justice
Kennedy's the same as Justice Alito's? How can political
scientists plausibly engage in the psychological projection
that assignment of ideological in-groups entails? Pettys
professes himself "skeptical" that this in-group identification
could "be satisfactorily done. '6 1 would go further, as I do not
see how it ever could be.
A second and deeper problem is that modern political
science deprives itself of any benchmark for assessing the
effect of in-group bias. What political scientists used to
understand "was that the most important question about
every Supreme Court decision is also the most interesting
question to the ordinary citizen, to the student, and hence to
the scholar as well-i.e., was it rightly decided?"7 By positing
how a justice should have voted, political scientists could
then explore the possible reasons why the iustice voted
otherwise. But the "behavioral revolution"8 in political
science that occurred in the middle of the twentieth century
is built on the assumption that iudicial decision-making is
best understood as the playing out of the subiective
motivations of judges. It has led to "the complete neglect of
legal reasoning, and the near-total exclusion of legal
principle as a causal force in judicial decision-making."'
The Epstein-Parker-Segal study is a typical example of
the behavioralist, or attitudinal, model. The authors never
even ask whether a particular Supreme Court decision they
code might be rightly decided. Nor do they exclude
5. Appendix C, (Excel version), line 3814 (Sept. 30, 2014),
http://epstein.wustl'edu/research/InGroupBias.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2015).
6. Id. at 77.
7. Matthew J. Franck, Book Review, 15 LAW AND POL. BOOK REV. 176, 177
(2005) (reviewing CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: CLASHES OVER POWER AND
LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT (Gregg Ivers & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2004)),
available at http://www.lawcourts.org/LPBRreviews/ivers-mcguire305.htm.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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unanimous rulings from their study. On the contrary: if a
unanimous ruling is in favor of a speaker whom they code to
be conservative, that ruling ipso facto provides evidence for
them that the conservative justices have indulged their in-
group bias and that the liberal justices have overcome
theirs.10 And, vice versa, of course, for unanimous rulings for
liberal speakers.
When Epstein, Parker, and Segal compile their simplistic
binary codings, they generate seemingly sophisticated tables
replete with statistical measures, to the third decimal place,
of mean, standard deviation, Bayesian credible intervals, and
more. 1 The only appropriate response, I would suggest, is to
laugh out loud at the pseudo-scientific absurdity.
Epstein, Parker, and Segal purport to assess whether the
voting pattern of a justice is "statistically significant."1 2 But
without taking a position on how the ideal justice should rule
in the various cases-an enterprise that would require the
exercise of legal judgment and that would, of course, be
highly contestable-they have no benchmark against which
to measure an actual justice's voting pattern. They implicitly
assume that the ideal justice would vote for liberal speakers
at the same percentage level as for conservative speakers.
That assumption in turn presupposes that the cases in which
claims of liberal speakers and conservative speakers arise
are equally meritorious. But there is no reason to think that
assumption is right, and there are plenty of reasons why it
might be wrong.
It might well be, for example, that the cases that reach
the Supreme Court disproportionately arise from liberal
appellate panels that issue adventuresome rulings for liberal
speakers (sleeping as speech, anyone?), and that are hostile
to conservative speech claims on matters of religion and
abortion. If that is the case, the ideal justice would end up
voting more for conservative speakers. For converse reasons,
the imbalance could, of course, be in the opposite direction.
To be clear: I do not dispute the possibility that in-group
bias might influence judicial decision-making. I simply do not
10. See generally Epstein et al., In-Group Bias, supra note 2.
11. Id. at 7-14.
12. Id. at 10 n.18.
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see how studies like the one by Epstein, Parker, and Segal
have any hope of meaningfully showing such influence. I am
open to the possibility that statistical analysis of voting
patterns might discover apparent anomalies that suggest
avenues for further exploration. But that further exploration,
if it is going to be fruitful, will have to involve the sometimes
difficult and often contestable work of legal reasoning-work
that is beyond the bounds that modern political scientists
have imposed on themselves.
